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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT OF STATE AND
MUNICIPAL RESIDENTIAL HIRING PREFERENCE LAWS
I. INTRODUCTION
Many states and municipalities have recently enacted legislation pro-
viding hiring preferences for residents of their jurisdictions - laws requir-
ing the hiring of state or municipal residents.' These laws are generally
intended to alleviate local unemployment and funnel local resources back
to the constituents of the enacting authority.2 Additionally, residence
1. See ALA. CODE § 39-3-2 (1992) (requiring hiring of workers with two years
of continuous residence for public works); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 34-302 (1990)
(requiring hiring of workers with minimum of one year of continuous residence
for public works); CAL. La. CODE § 2015 (West 1989) (giving preference on pub-
lic works, first to Californians, second to nonresident United States citizens, third
to aliens in California); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-52 (West 1987) (requiring
hiring of residents for public works whenever possible); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29,
§ 6913 (1991) (giving hiring preference for public works to those with minimum
of 90 days of continuous residence); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 255.04 (West 1991) (requir-
ing hiring of residents for public works whenever cost is no greater than hiring
nonresidents); HAW. REv. STAT. § 103.57 (1985) (requiring hiring of residents for
public works whenever possible); IDAHO CODE § 44-1001 (Supp. 1995) (requiring
95% of workers on public works be residents); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, para. 560/3
(Smith-Hurd 1986) (requiring hiring of residents for public works whenever possi-
ble); IOWA CODE ANN. § 73.3 (West 1991) (same); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
§ 1301 (West 1988) (same); Miss. CODE ANN. § 31-5-17 (1990) (requiring hiring of
workers with two years of continuous residence for public works); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 18-2-403 (1993) (requiring hiring of residents for public works whenever
possible); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 338.130 (Michie 1994) (same); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 43-07-20 (1995) (requiring hiring preference on public works for residents, only
where in accord with federal law); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 193 (West 1986)
(requiring 90% of workers on public works be residents); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§ 154 (1992) (giving hiring preference for public works to those with minimum of
90 days of continuous residence); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 5-19-6 (1994) (re-
quiring hiring of residents for public works whenever possible); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 55-3-33 (1995) (same); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 39.16.005 (West 1991) (requir-
ing hiring of at least 95% residents for workers public works whenever possible,
with exception for residents of reciprocating border states); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 101.43 (West 1988) (giving preference to residents for public works in periods of
extraordinary unemployment); WYo. STAT. § 16-6-203 (1990) (requiring hiring of
residents for public works whenever possible); see also Werner Z. Hirsch, The Consti-
tutionality of State Preference (Residency) Laws Under the Privileges and Immunity Clause,
22 Sw. U. L. REv. 1, 3 n.9 (1992) (citing state hiring preference statutes and dis-
cussing common provisions of those statutes); Thomas H. Day, Note, Hiring Prefer-
ence Acts: Has the Supreme Court Rendered Them Violations of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, 54 FoRDHAM L. REv. 271, 272 n.13 (1985) (same).
2. See Hirsch, supra note 1, at 1-2 (quoting legislative debates and asserted
purposes of particular preference laws); Day, supra note 1, at 271-72 (noting rela-
tively high unemployment in construction and primacy of local and state govern-
ment in funding construction).
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preference laws are premised upon simple parochialism, which raises par-
ticular concerns for the courts.3
Obviously, because these laws disadvantage nonresidents, such prefer-
ences have potential discriminatory effects upon interstate commerce and
the "privileges and immunities" of non-residents, and may deny "equal
protection."4 Accordingly, hiring preferences have been challenged as
constitutionally suspect.5 The results of these challenges vary with both
the particularized facts of each case and with the constitutional provision
at issue. 6
This Casebrief addresses the Third Circuit's development of the law
regarding the constitutionality of local hiring preferences. First, Part II
provides an historic overview of the relevant constitutional provisions.7
Part II also provides a summary of recent United States Supreme Court
holdings with respect to hiring preference laws. 8 Next, Part III specifically
explores the treatment of local hiring preferences by the United States
3. SeeSupreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 285 n.18 (1985) (quoting
Smith, Time for a National Practice of Law Act, 64 A.BA. J. 557, 557, 560 (1978)
(noting that protecting in-state lawyers from "professional competition" through
state bar residency requirements is type of economic protectionism Privileges and
Immunities Clause is intended to prevent)); United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Coun-
cil v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 217-18, 217 n.9 (1984) (noting concern for
regionalism and parochialism that could defeat purpose of Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause of Article IV); id. at 230-31 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (stressing clause
is necessary "because state parochialism is likely to go unchecked by state political
processes when those who are disadvantaged are by definition disenfranchised as
well"); Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE LJ. 425,
443-46 (1982) (arguing courts should look to Privileges and Immunities Clause to
prevent state parochialism from disadvantaging out-of-state commercial actors);
Mark P. Gergen, The Selfish State and the Market, 66 TEx. L. REv. 1097, 1100-06
(1988) (discussing tension between interstate equality and state sovereignty); Don-
ald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 84 MIcH. L. REv. 1091, 1092 (1986) (stating that Supreme Court
should focus exclusively on "preventing states from engaging in purposeful eco-
nomic protectionism"); Bryan H. Wildenthal, Note, State Parochialism, the Right to
Trave and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1557,
1557 (1989) (noting that recent Supreme Court jurisprudence indicates strong
aversion to state parochialism).
4. See U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress power "[t]o regulate
Commerce ... among the several States"); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (providing
"[the Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens in the several States."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (prohibiting states
from denying "to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."). For a discussion of challenges to preferential laws, see infra notes 20-89
and accompanying text.
5. For a discussion of challenges to preference laws and the standards applied
by the United States Supreme Court, see infra notes 13-89 and accompanying text.
6. For a discussion of the case law regarding constitutional challenges to resi-
dent hiring preference laws, see infra notes 13-130 and accompanying text.
7. For a discussion of Supreme Court holdings and history, see infra notes 13-
89 and accompanying text.
8. For a discussion of Supreme Court cases, see infra notes 20-89 and accom-
panying text.
804 [Vol. 40: p. 803
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Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and examines other courts' ap-
proaches to these laws.9 Finally, Part IV focuses on the Third Circuit's
recent pronouncement regarding hiring preferences in Salem Blue Collar
Workers Ass'n v. City of Salem10 and assesses the consistency of the this hold-
ing with Supreme Courtjurisprudence. 1I In conclusion, this Casebrief ex-
amines potential difficulties that arise when courts analyze hiring
preferences, and moreover, identifies Salem's significance within this
dialogue.1 2
II. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE: PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES CLAUSE OF ARTICLE IV AND THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE
The Supreme Court reviews preference laws under both the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV13 and the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution. 14 This dual analysis is not surprising in light
of the clauses' "mutually reinforcing relationship" and their common ori-
gin within the Articles of Confederation.1 5 However, the Court's analyses
9. For a discussion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
and other circuits' jurisprudence regarding resident hiring preferences, see infra
notes 90-182 and accompanying text.
10. 33 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1105 (1995).
11. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's application of the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence in this area, see infra notes 142-82 and accompanying text.
12. For conclusions of the difficulties that arise when courts evaluate hiring
preference laws, see infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
13. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. This Casebrief will generally refer to this
clause as the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV in order to distinguish
it from the similarly worded clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That clause
provides: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1. The Fourteenth Amendment addresses state discrimination with respect to
state law, while the Article IV clause applies to rights of national citizenship. See
The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72-77 (1872) (limiting Four-
teenth Amendment to rights of state citizens and article IV to "privileges and im-
munities of citizens of the United States"); Gary J. Simson, Discrimination Against
Nonresidents and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 128 U. PA. L. REv.
379, 379 n.1 (1979) (distinguishing the two clauses).
14. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause provides that "The
Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce . . .among the several
States").
15. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 531-32 (1978) (invoking Commerce
Clause although appellants raised only privileges and immunities challenge be-
cause of clauses' "mutually reinforcing relationship ... and their shared vision of
federalism" and citing ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. 4 as common source). The
precise language of the Articles stated:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and inter-
course among the people of the different States in this Union, the free
inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from
justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free
citizens in the several States; and the people of each State shall have free
ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein
1995]
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under the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Commerce Clause are
not identical, and therefore must be considered separately. 16
A. The Protection of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
Courts have traditionally viewed the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of Article IV as primarily intended "to help fuse into one Nation a collec-
tion of independent, sovereign States."1 7 The Privileges and Immunities
all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, im-
positions, and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV; see Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S.
274, 279-80 (1985) (noting common origin of Commerce Clause and Privileges
and Immunities Clause); Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371,
379-80 (1978) (same); W.C.M. Window Co. v. Bernardi, 730 F.2d 486, 496 (1984)
(stating that clauses are so closely related "it would be artificial to ignore one of
them"); David S. Bogen, The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 37 CASE W.
REs. L. REv. 794 (1987) (analyzing historical development of fourth article of Arti-
cles of Confederation and Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV); Gergen,
supra note 3, at 1118-28 (detailing origin of Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, as well as origin of Article Four of Articles of Confederation); Day, supra
note 1, at 273-74 (noting common origin and need to consider Commerce Clause
and Privileges and Immunities Clause in analyzing hiring preferences).
16. Compare United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465
U.S. 208 (1984) (finding Camden ordinance that required that 40% of employees
on city construction projects be Camden residents was within purview of Privileges
and Immunities Clause) with White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers,
460 U.S. 204, 214-15 (1983) (upholding against Commerce Clause challenge exec-
utive order by Mayor of Boston requiring at least half of work force on publicly
funded construction to be Boston residents).
Supreme Court precedent suggests that this separation was possibly due to
concern that the Commerce Clause would be read too narrowly. Baldwin, 436 U.S.
at 379-80; see Camden, 465 U.S. at 219-20 (holding White's Commerce Clause analy-
sis not dispositive because Privileges and Immunities Clause has "different aims"
and "standards for state conduct"); People ex rel. Bernardi v. Leary Constr. Co., 464
N.E.2d 1019, 1022 (Ill. 1984) (holding Commerce Clause "market participant" ex-
ception not relevant to Privileges and Immunities Clause challenge); Eule, supra
note 3, at 447-48 (arguing Privileges and Immunities Clause was originally in-
tended to provide protection subsequently placed in Dormant Commerce Clause).
But see Michael J. Polelle, A Critique of the Market Participant Exception, 15 WHrIrTIER
L. REv. 647, 677-82 (1994) (criticizing such distinctions between clauses because
constitutionality turns on characterization of challenge). For a discussion of the
varying applications in White and Camden, see infra notes 64-89 and accompanying
text.
17. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948). In Toomer, the Court stressed
that the goal of bringing the states together should be accomplished by insuring to
"a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same privileges which the citi-
zens of State B enjoy." Id. This clause was required, as the citizens of State A
would otherwise be restricted to the "uncertain remedies" of diplomacy. Id.; see
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869) (stating "the object of the clause
... [was] to place the citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens of
other States" with respect to advantages of state citizenship). Despite its goals, the
Privileges and Immunities Clause has not been extensively litigated. See Baldwin,
436 U.S. at 379 (stating that contours of clause have not been "precisely shaped by
the process and wear of constant litigation and judicial interpretation"); Bogen,
supra note 15, at 795-96 (noting lack ofjudicial, historical and scholarly discussion
4
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Clause is intended to prevent discrimination against nonresidents by se-
curing to nonresidents "those privileges and immunities" common to citi-
zens of the United States "by virtue of their being citizens. ' 18 While the
scope of this protection is not completely clear, it does not secure state
provided "special privileges" to local citizens and very clearly does not ex-
tend to corporations. 19
The Supreme Court's modern jurisprudence under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause stems from Toomer v. Witsell.20 This 1948 decision
struck down a South Carolina statute requiring nonresident shrimp boat
owners to pay a license fee 100 times greater than that charged to resident
boat owners.21 Toomer held that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV was not absolute and announced a two-part test for assessing the
of Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV). However, as one commentator
noted, litigation in recent years has refined the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of Article IV - particularly with respect to hiring preferences. Hirsch, supra note
1, at 11.
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article V also provides the basis for
nonresidents' right of access to courts. See, e.g., Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12
Wall.) 418, 430 (1870) (stating that "privileges and immunities" include right to
maintain actions in courts). Additionally, Justice O'Connor and some commenta-
tors would place the right to travel within this clause. See Zobel v. Williams, 457
U.S. 55, 81 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (placing right to travel in clause
would "at least begin the task of reuniting this elusive right with the constitutional
principles it embodies"); Bogen, supra note 15, at 845-52 (discussing right to travel
under Article IV and stating constitutional right to travel is supported "with Consti-
tutional text" of Article IV); Seth F. Kreimer, "But Whoever Treasures Freedom... ".
The Right to Travel and Extraterritorial Abortions, 91 MIcH. L. REv. 907, 917-21 (1993)
(noting that Americans traveling from state to state are "entitled to the privileges
and immunities of local citizens").
18. Paul, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 180 (noting that clause does not give laws of one
state operation in another, but protects privileges and immunities of national citi-
zenship); see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343-44 (1972) (upholding discrimi-
nation against nonresidents regarding in-state voting); Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S.
239, 254-55 (1898) (holding state law barring nonresidents' receipt of distribution
from insolvent foreign corporations infringed right secured by national citizen-
ship, and violated Privileges and Immunities Clause).
Although the Clause refers to "citizens," the terms "citizens" and "residents"
are interchangeable in the context of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Cam-
den, 465 U.S. at 216; Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 662 n.8 (1975); Blake,
172 U.S. at 247 (1898).
19. Pau4 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 180-81 (holding grant of corporate charter is "a
grant of special privileges"); see Zobel, 457 U.S. at 73-74 n.3 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (stating that it is settled law that Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV does not protect corporations).
20. 334 U.S. 385 (1948); see Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 525 (citing Toomer as "the
leading modem exposition of the limitations the [Privileges and Immunities]
Clause places on a State's power to bias employment opportunities"); Hirsch, supra
note 1, at 12 (stating that Toomer marks beginning of Supreme Court's modern
Privilege and Immunities Clause analysis); Day, supra note 1, at 274 (describing
Toomer as "parent" of modern Privileges and Immunities Clause cases).
21. Toomer, 334 U.S. at 389. Specifically, the statute required South Carolina
residents to pay $25 per shrimpboat, while charging non-residents $2500 per boat.
Id.
1995]
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constitutionality of discrimination against non-citizens. 22 This two-pro-
nged test allows discrimination "where (i) there is a substantial reason for
the difference in treatment; and (ii) the discrimination practiced against
nonresidents bears a substantial relationship to the State's objective. '2 3
The Court noted that to satisfy the first prong of the test, a state must
demonstrate that nonresidents "constitute a peculiar source of the evil at
which the statute is aimed."24 The Court also stated that in determining
whether the state satisfies the test's second prong, courts should consider
the availability of less restrictive means.25
Under this standard, the Toomer Court found that the record failed to
indicate that either the nonresident shrimp fishers' equipment or tech-
niques constituted a "peculiar source" of evil. 26 The Court further noted
that even if "substantial reason" existed, the discrimination did not bear a
reasonable relationship to the supposed danger. 27 Thus, the Court con-
cluded that South Carolina's statute violated the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause.28
22. Id. at 396.
23. Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 284 (1985) (citing Toomer,
334 U.S. at 396) (distilling two-pronged test formulated in Toomer to single sen-
tence); see Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546, 552 (1989) (citing Piper for formu-
lation of test); United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465
U.S. 208, 222 (1984) (citing Toomer test); Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 525-26 (citing Toomer
as leading precedent and stating test).
24. Toomer, 334 U.S. at 398; see Day, supra note 1, at 275 (setting forth Toomer
test and noting Supreme Court's subsequent development of test).
25. Toomer, 334 U.S. at 398-99 (noting that state could protect interests with
less restrictive means); see also Piper, 470 U.S. at 284 (stating that decision involves
consideration of "availability of less restrictive means").
26. Toomer, 334 U.S. at 398. The state contended that the nonresident fisher-
men used methods and boats that endangered South Carolina's shrimp supply. Id.
However, the Court found nothing in the record to support this assertion. Id.
27. Id. at 398. The Court noted that in any case, the discrimination did not
bear a "reasonable relationship" to the danger posed by non-citizens. Id. This was
particularly true in light of the fact that the statute did not appear to be aimed at
any specific concerns. Id. Thus, the statute did not employ the least restrictive
means available to remedy a "substantial reason for the difference in treatment."
See id. at 398-99 (noting South Carolina could have eliminated dangers with less
restrictive means); see also Piper, 470 U.S. at 284 (noting less restrictive means
should be considered in addressing "substantial relationship"); United Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 222 (1984) (quoting Toomer, 334
U.S. at 396) (stating that valid discrimination must bear "close relation" to "sub-
stantial reason").
28. Toomer, 334 U.S. at 403. The Court also held that the state's proprietary
interest in the shrimp in the "marginal sea" was insufficient to provide an excep-
tion to the Clause. Id. at 399-402. This was particularly true because shrimp are
migratory and not harvested from inland waters. Id. at 401-02; cf McCready v.
Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 396-97 (1876) (holding statute to be discriminatory to non-
resident commercial fisherman where fish remained in Virginia's inland waters).
For a discussion of a state's proprietary interests in resources, see infra notes 55-58
and accompanying text.
808 [Vol. 40: p. 803
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B. Fundamental Privileges and Immunities
Toome's two-pronged test represents the second step in a Privileges
and Immunities claim analysis. The first step requires determining
whether state action discriminates against "'privileges' and 'immunities'
bearing upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity." 29 In broad
terms, determining whether the interest in question is "fundamental" an-
swers this question.30 Additionally, states may discriminate against nonres-
idents where the discrimination is "necessary to preserve the basic
conception of a political community."
3
'
The Supreme Court specifically addressed the issue of "fundamental
rights" in Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission of Montana.3 2 In Baldwin, the
Court upheld a Montana elk-hunting licensing scheme against a "Privi-
leges and Immunities" challenge where the law required greater fees for
nonresidents than for Montana residents. 33 The Court based its holding
upon a determination that elk-hunting is not a fundamental right.
3 4
In analyzing fundamental rights, the Baldwin Court discussed Justice
Washington's opinion in Corfield v. Coryel43 5 an early decision in which
Justice Washington served as Circuit Justice.3 6 While upholding a New
Jersey law restricting access to the state's oyster beds, the opinion
grounded the Privileges and Immunities Clause in the natural rights be-
longing "of right" to citizens "of all free governments."3 7 The Baldwin
29. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978).
30. See Camden, 465 U.S. at 218 (articulating threshold test as whether nonres-
idents' asserted interest is sufficiently "fundamental" to fall within clause); Baldwin,
436 U.S. at 388 (holding elk hunting was not "sufficiently basic to the livelihood of
the nation" to be "fundamental").
31. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343-44 (1972) (upholding discrimina-
tion in bona fide residence requirements, while striking durational requirements).
32. 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
33. Id. at 372-74. The scheme required nonresidents wishing to hunt elk in
Montana to purchase a "combination" license, which allowed hunting of several
types of large game. Id. at 373. This license cost $151 in 1975 and $225 in 1976.
Id. In contrast, Montana residents could purchase a license, solely for elk hunting,
for four dollars in 1975 and nine dollars in 1976. Id. Additionally, a resident
could purchase a "combination", license for $30 in 1976. Id. at 373-74.
The Court also upheld this scheme under an equal protection challenge. Id.
at 388-90. The Court found that Montana's legislature made its determinations
based upon legitimate interests in preserving the state's elk population and that
the scheme was therefore rational. Id. at 390. For a discussion of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause in the hiring preference context, see infra note 45.
34. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 388, 393-94 (holding that nonresident elk hunting in
Montana was not sufficiently basic to Nation's livelihood to be fundamental under
"privileges and immunities").
35. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
36. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 384 (looking to Corfield as first exposition of Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV); see also Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S.
656, 661 (1975) (citing Corfield as "the first, and long the leading, explication of
the Clause").
37. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551-52. In defining the limits of "privileges and immu-
nities," Justice Washington stated:
7
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Court noted that Corfield formed the basis for much of the nineteenth
century jurisprudence with respect to the Privileges and Immunities
Clause.3 8 However, the Baldwin Court stressed that the "fundamental
rights" espoused in Corfield actually addressed whether the rights were "es-
sential. '3 9 From this premise, the Court easily concluded that recreational
elk-hunting was not essential or fundamental to the nation's livelihood.40
In assessing claims under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the
Supreme Court consistently holds that the pursuit of a "common calling"
is fundamental and therefore within the Clause's protection. 4 1 For exam-
We feel no'hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges
and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong,
of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all
times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose
this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and
sovereign.
Id. at 551; see Bogen, supra note 15, at 841-45 (discussing natural law in historical
context of clause).
38. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 385.
39. Id. at 387. The Baldwin Court noted thatJustice Washington, while speak-
ing in terms of "natural rights," included only those "where a nonresident sought
to engage in ... essential activit[ies]." Id. The Court noted that this is the princi-
ple behind the notion of "common callings." Id. Ultimately, the Court deter-
mined that states must treat residents and nonresidents equally only in activities
essential to the "formation of the Union." Id.; see Day, supra note 1, at 276 n.30
(noting modern conception of "fundamental" differs from "natural rights" view).
40. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 388. Justice Brennan argued in dissent for the aban-
donment of considerations concerning whether the right in question is fundamen-
tal. Id. at 402 (Brennan,J., dissenting). He encouraged the Court to simply review
discrimination by examining the State's justification under the basic principles of
Toomer. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
41. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S.
208, 219 (1984) (noting "pursuit of a common calling is one of the most funda-
mental of those privileges protected by the [Privileges and Immunities] Clause.");
Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524 (1978) (noting that Court's decisions hold
discrimination against nonresidents seeking to pursue common callings violative
of Privileges and Immunities Clause); Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 387 (linking "essential
activities" to "common callings"); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430(1870) (noting that "privileges and immunities" include going from one state to
another for purposes "of engaging in lawful commerce, trade, or business without
molestation"); Salem Blue Collar Workers Ass'n v. City of Salem, 33 F.3d 265, 268-
69 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that "common callings" are within protection of Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1105 (1995); Bogen, supra
note 15, at 831 (noting that despite uncertainty of scope, Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause prohibits discrimination against nonresidents engaging in trade or
commerce); Gergen, supra note 3, at 1129 (noting that Privileges and Immunities
Clause protects privileges of trade and commerce); Day, supra note 1, at 277, 277-
78 n.32 (noting consistent recognition of protection for "common callings" under
Clause and citing relevant case law).
Although the courts have not defined "common calling," the phrase appears
to be used in terms of the words' everyday meanings. Webster's defines "common"
as "known to the community," and "calling" as "the vocation or profession in which
one customarily engages." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 265,
198 (1987). Thus, a common calling is a profession or vocation known to the
community. Id.
[Vol. 40: p. 803
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pie, in Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper,42 the Court struck down a
residency requirement for admission to the New Hampshire bar.43 In so
doing, the Court determined that the practice of law is sufficiently impor-
tant to the national economy to deserve protection as a fundamental
privilege. 44
C. Hiring Preferences In Public Employment
Supreme Court precedent does not definitively state whether public
employment constitutes a fundamental right under the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause; however, the Court has explicitly protected private em-
ployers contracting with government entities. 45 For example, in Hicklin v.
42. 470 U.S. 274 (1985).
43. Id. at 288. The state offered several justifications for denying nonresi-
dents admittance to the bar. Id. at 285. However, the Court held that none of
these met the standards required under the Toomer test - finding each either
insubstantial or not sufficiently closely tailored. Id. at 285-87. The Court summa-
rized its conclusions: "appellant neither advances a 'substantial reason' for its dis-
crimination against nonresident applicants to the bar, nor demonstrates that the
discrimination practiced bears a close relationship to its proffered objectives." Id.
at 287 (footnote omitted). For a discussion of the Toomer test, see supra notes 20-
28 and accompanying text.
Bar admission standards are litigated frequently under the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause. See Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546, 559 (1989) (holding that
Virgin Island's one-year residency requirement for bar admittance violated Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause); Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman, 487 U.S.
59, 70 (1988) (holding that Virginia requirement which otherwise qualified non-
resident attorneys take bar exam violated Privilege and Immunities Clause, despite
ability to enter bar by passing exam). Friedman essentially restated the basic Toomer
analysis and several lower courts have cited Friedman in assessing Privileges and
Immunities Clause claims. See, e.g., O'Reilly v. Board of Appeals, 942 F.2d 281, 284
(4th Cir. 1991) (citing Friedman for privileges and immunities analysis). For a dis-
cussion of O'Reilly, see infra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
44. Piper, 470 U.S. at 281, 283. New Hampshire contended this discrimina-
tion could be justified because attorneys are officers of the court. Id. at 282.
Therefore, residency requirements for bar admittance would be essential to the
state's "ability to function as a sovereign political body." Id. In rejecting this con-
tention, the Supreme Court noted that lawyers carry on their own business affairs
and are generally uninvolved in matters of state policy formation. Id. at 283.
Justice Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion, strongly disagreed with the ma-
jority. Id. at 289-97 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He argued that the states have a
substantial interest in ensuring that lawyers become members of the constituency.
Id. at 291 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist premised this contention
upon the notion that lawyers play a key role in the formation and application of
state policy. Id. at 291-94 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist was also
critical of the majority's willingness to "second guess" New Hampshire's justifica-
tions and legislative choices. Id. at 294-97 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
45. See Salem, 33 F.3d at 269 (noting that Supreme Court came close to decid-
ing issue in Camden). In Camden, the Court stated that public employment is "qual-
itatively different" from employment in the private sector, while concluding that
public employment does implicate a fundamental privilege. Camden, 465 U.S. at
219. In Salem, the Third Circuit stressed that the Camden decision held that the
Clause only protects "indirect" employment. Salem, 33 F.3d at 269-70. However,
the Supreme Court has held that there is no fundamental right to public employ-
1995]
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Orbeck,46 the Court held that the "Alaska Hire" statute violated the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.47 Intending to alleviate
Alaska's unemployment problems, "Alaska Hire" mandated preferential
hiring of Alaskans in oil and gas related businesses.48 The statute's man-
date reached all "employment which is a result of oil and gas" agreements
with Alaska. 49 Thus, "Alaska Hire" reached employers with no direct rela-
tion to the state. 50
In assessing "Alaska Hire" under the Toomer analysis, the Court found
that Alaska could not demonstrate that nonresidents were a "peculiar
source" of the state's high unemployment. 51 Furthermore, even if the
state could make such a showing, the statute's grant of a simple preference
to all Alaskans was not "substantially related" to the reduction of unem-
ployment.52 The Court noted that this hiring preference focussed not
only on the unemployed, but applied "across the board" to all Alaskans.
5 3
Accordingly, the Court held that the statute was not "closely tailored to aid
the unemployment the Act is meant to benefit."
5 4
Alternatively, Alaska argued that its "proprietary interests" in the
state's natural resources exempted the statute from the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause.5 5 The Court recognized that both its earlier decisions
ment under the Equal Protection Clause. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 317 (1976) (upholding mandatory retirement of uniformed
police); McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645, 647 (1976)
(upholding continuous residency requirement for firefighters).
46. 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
47. Id. at 534 ("Alaska Hire cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.").
48. Id. at 520 & n.2 (quoting ALAsKA STAT. § 38.40.030(a) (1977) (noting pur-
pose of statute was to reduce unemployment)).
49. Id. at 529 (quoting ALAsKA STAT. § 38.40.050(a) (1977)). The section pro-
vided, in part, that "[t] he provisions of this chapter apply to all employment which is
a result of oil and gas leases, easements, leases or right-of-way permits for oil or gas
pipeline purposes, unitization agreements or any renegotiation of the preceding to
which the state is a party .... ." Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
50. Id. at 530 (citing language of statute and noting extension to employers
not contracting with Alaska).
51. Id. at 526-27. The Court noted that the record indicated Alaska's unem-
ployment problems were not caused "by an influx of nonresidents seeking employ-
ment." Id. To the contrary, Justice Brennan found that the record indicated that
lack of education and geographic remoteness were largely responsible for the
state's high unemployment. Id. Accordingly, the influx of nonresidents would
have little effect upon the employed status of many Alaskans. Id.
52. Id. at 527 (holding that even if state demonstrated peculiar evil, "Alaska
Hire nevertheless fails to pass constitutional muster").
53. Id. at 527-28. Specifically, the Court worried that the preference was not
limited to the unemployed. Id. The preference applied to all jobs within the
broad scope of the Act and to all Alaskans. Id. at 527. The Court also stressed that
highly-skilled and currently employed residents received the same preference over
nonresidents as the under-skilled and habitually unemployed. Id. at 527-28.
54. Id. at 528 (holding that discrimination against nonresidents must be
"more closely tailored" to purpose of reducing unemployment).
55. Id. (contending state "ownership" of oil and gas is sufficient justification
for Act and removes Act from scope of Privileges and Immunities Clause).
[Vol. 40: p. 803
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and lower court holdings stated that a state's interest in its own natural
resources created an "exception" to the Privileges and Immunities protec-
tions.56 Nevertheless, the Court held that the state's proprietary interest
in its natural resources, while often a crucial factor in evaluating discrimi-
nation against noncitizens, is not necessarily dispositive.5 7 Ultimately, the
Court found that "Alaska Hire" reached activities "sufficiently attenuated"
from the asserted interests to refute the state's justification.58
C. Contrasting the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Commerce
Clause: From White to Camden
Hicklin provided that state ownership of resources is not an interest
sufficient to withstand a Privileges and Immunities challenge. 59 However,
hiring preferences in public employment necessarily implicate the Com-
merce Clause, because they affect employers' ability to engage in "inter-
state commerce." 60  The Commerce Clause appropriates power to
Congress to regulate interstate commerce. 6 1 Additionally, the Commerce
Clause includes a negative or dormant aspect, which prohibits state regula-
tion from unduly burdening interstate commerce.62 Under Commerce
56. Id. The state relied on McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876), where
the Court held that Virginia was free to bar nonresidents from inland oyster beds.
Id. at 395-96. The Court premised its holding upon the idea that the state "owned"
its natural resources and could use or dispose of them as it saw fit. Id. at 396. The
Court stated: "[W]e may safely hold that the citizens of one State are not invested
by this [Privileges and Immunities C]lause of the Constitution with any interest in
the common property of the citizens of another state." Id. at 395. This argument
succeeded in the Alaska Supreme Court, which held that McCready created an ex-
ception to the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159,
169 (Alaska 1977), rev'd, 437 U.S. 518 (1978) .
57. Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 529; see Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n of Mont., 436
U.S. 371, 385 (1978) (holding that state's interest in things it claims to own is not
absolute).
58. Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 529. For a discussion of the Court's analysis under
Toomer, see supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text.
59. For a discussion of the relevance of the states' proprietary interests, see
supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
60. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204,
209 & n.6 (1983) (noting that Massachusetts found "significant impact" on firms
with nonresident workers, although questioning this conclusion); W.C.M. Window
Co. v. Bernardi, 730 F.2d 486, 494 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting potentially great cumu-
lative effects of preference laws).
61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v.
Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 220 (1984) (stating that "[t ] he Commerce Clause
acts as an implied restraint upon state regulatory powers"); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 169-71 (1824) (holding that Congress could legislate with re-
spect to all commerce affecting more than one state, and state law in conflict with
valid congressional legislation violates Supremacy Clause). For a discussion of the
common origins of the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Commerce
Clause, see supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.62. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978)
(holding that state could not achieve its end through means that discriminate
"against articles of commerce coming from outside the State"); Dean Milk Co. v.
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Clause jurisprudence, however, the Commerce Clause does not constrain
a state when it acts as a "market participant."63
The market participant exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause
was at issue in White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers.64 In
White, the Court upheld an executive order requiring that Boston resi-
dents make up at least one-half of all employees on public construction
projects in Boston. 65 In construing the Commerce Clause, the Court con-
cluded that the City of Boston was a market participant in the construction
industry and was therefore free to give a hiring preference to its own
citizens. 66
The White Court began its analysis by reaffirming the "market partici-
pant" exception to the Commerce Clause. 67 The Court stressed that when
the state is a market participant, the Commerce Clause requires no further
inquiry.68 Accordingly, the Court held that the executive order did not
violate the Commerce Clause because the city of Boston expended munici-
pal funds and was consequently a market participant. 69
Although White seemingly condoned hiring preferences, the Court re-
jected a similar hiring preference just one year later in United Building &
City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356 (1951). (holding that restriction of milk sales
would invite preferential trade areas); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12
How.) 299, 316-17 (1851) (holding that states could not regulate aspects of com-
merce requiring national uniformity); WC.M. Window, 730 F.2d at 493 (noting
"dormant" aspect of Commerce Clause).
63. See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 95-97
(1984) (stating that market participant doctrine provides exception to Dormant
Commerce Clause's limitation imposed on states when state acts as participant in
market and not merely regulator); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 (1980)
(upholding market participant exception because it "makes good sense and sound
law"); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976) (holding that
purposes of Commerce Clause are not implicated when state acts as participant in
market); see also Day, supra note 1, at 279-80 n.41 (discussing development of "mar-
ket participant" jurisprudence in discussing White).
64. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
65. Id. at 205-06. The executive order was issued by the Mayor of Boston and
it extended to projects funded with city money or city-administered federal money.
Id. at 205 & n.1. The executive order also provided for "set-asides" for minorities
and women. Id. at 205. However, the respondents only challenged the residency
requirement. Id. at 205-06.
66. Id. at 214-15. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts previously
held that this order violated the Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers v. Mayor of Boston, 425
N.E.2d 346, 355 (Mass. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 460 U.S. 204 (1983). However,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari only with respect to the Commerce Clause
and did not review the ordinance under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
White, 460 U.S. at 214 n.12.
67. White, 460 U.S. at 206-08 (reaffirming principle of market participant
exception).
68. Id. For a discussion of the Commerce Clause and the market participant
exception, see supra notes 59-68 and infra note 69 and accompanying text.
69. Id. at 214-15.
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Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden.70 In Camden, the Court ad-
dressed a state-approved city ordinance requiring that at least forty per-
cent of employees on city construction projects be residents of Camden,
NewJersey. 71 Notably, the Court held that the municipal ordinance impli-
cated the Privileges and Immunities Clause, even where the market partici-
pant doctrine removed it from the strictures of the Commerce Clause. 72
Thus, the Court recognized a distinction in the purposes of the two
clauses.73 The Privileges and Immunities Clause "imposes a direct re-
straint on state action in the interests of interstate harmony," while the
Commerce Clause "acts as an implied restraint upon state regulatory pow-
ers."'74 Nevertheless, the Court remanded the case because the record was
insufficient to "evaluate Camden's justification" under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause. 75
In discussing the applicability of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of Article IV, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, noted that the
state expressly approved the ordinance in question.76 Justice Rehnquist
then concluded that municipal action must comport with the Privileges
and Immunities Clause, even absent direct state involvement, because a
municipality, such as Camden, "is merely a political subdivision of the
70. 465 U.S. 208 (1984).
71. Id. at 210. This ordinance was in accordance with NewJersey's statewide
affirmative action policies, which permitted the state treasurer to establish hiring
requirements. Id. at 210 & n.2. The program also permitted municipalities to
submit plans to the treasurer for approval. Id. Camden submitted such a plan,
which the Treasury Department subsequently approved after conducting "brief ad-
ministrative proceedings." Id. at 212.
72. Id. at 221. The Camden Court held the Commerce Clause did not prevent
Camden from pressuring private employers to hire Camden residents, but ordi-
nance implicated Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id. This is particularly inter-
esting because White appeared to uphold preferences just a year earlier. Id. at 214.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the ordinance in White
violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and Camden's ordinance was very
similar to Boston's. See Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers v. Mayor of
Boston, 425 N.E.2d 346, 352-53 (Mass. 1981) (holding Mayor's order violated Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause), revd on other grounds, 460 U.S. 204 (1983). Yet, the
Supreme Court did not consider the Privileges and Immunities Clause claim.
White, 460 U.S. at 214 n.12. Thus, prior to the Camden decision, the market partici-
pant exception seemed to provide "blanket immunity" for preferences similar to
those in White. See Polelle, supra note 16, at 677 (noting that lower courts refused
to make factual determinations believing White resolved issue).
73. Camden, 465 U.S. at 220 (stating that Commerce Clause analysis is not
dispositive because its aims and standards differ from those of Privileges and Im-
munities Clause).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 223. For a discussion of justification required under Toomer, see
supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text.
76. Id. at 214-15. As previously noted, the New Jersey Treasury Department
approved Camden's ordinance after a brief administrative proceeding. Id. at 212.
For a discussion of the state program and its approval, see supra note 71 and ac-
companying text.
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State."77 Additionally, the Court held that although the ordinance dis-
criminated on the basis of city rather than state residence, it was still sub-
ject to constitutional challenge. 78 Justice Rehnquist reasoned that a
nonresident of a particular state "is ipso facto not residing in a city within
that State."79 Therefore, the Court concluded that municipal preferences
discriminate against nonresidents.8 0
The Court's decision in Camden was significant because it established
that municipal hiring ordinances do not constitute per se violations of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause.8 1 While the city of Camden argued that
the.ordinance was "necessary to counteract ... social ills" and would pre-
vent nonresidents from "liv[ing] off" Camden without "living in" Cam-
den, 82 the Court ultimately found it was impossible to evaluate these
justifications under the Toomer standard because the city did not present
any findings of fact.83
Thus, analysis under the Privileges and Immunities Clause requires a
two-step inquiry.84 First, there must be a finding of discrimination against
77. Id. at 215.
78. Id. at 215-16. The city argued that the language of the clause refers to
"citizens of each State" and therefore does not apply to municipal residence. Id.
Justice Rehnquist rejected this argument and stated that the Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause is not to be read so narrowly that it would only apply to distinctions
based upon state citizenship. Id. at 216; see Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415,
419-20 (1952) (holding that Alaska territory could not discriminate in favor of
territory's residents any more than states could favor their citizens). Justice Rehn-
quist then noted that "citizen" and "resident" are synonymous in this context.
Camden, 465 U.S. at 216 (citing Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 662 n.8
(1975)).
79. Camden, 465 U.S. at 216-17.
80. Id. at 217. Justice Blackmun disagreed with this proposition, arguing that
the clause did not reach municipal ordinances such as Camden's. Id. at 224
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Instead, Justice Blackmun believed in history and pre-
cedent which indicated that the drafters intended to eradicate the evils of state
parochialism. Id. at 225-35 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). However, Justice Rehnquist
noted in response that to hold otherwise would provide a means to avoid the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause through intrastate regional preferences. Id. at 217
n.9.
81. See Hirsch, supra note 1, at 14 (noting remand indicated that Court did
not expressly reject Camden's justifications); Day, supra note 1, at 283 (noting that
remand indicated possibility that some discrimination could meet demands of
Constitutional scrutiny under Privileges and Immunities Clause).
82. Camden, 465 U.S. at 222.
83. Id. at 221-23. The Court stressed that no trial ever took place and there
was only an administrative hearing before the city approved the ordinance. Id. at
223. There was no trial because the Supreme Court of New Jersey certified the
challenge for direct appeal. Id. The NewJersey high court rejected the Privileges
and Immunities claim because the ordinance had substantially the same effects on
nonresidents as on residents not living in Camden. United Bldg. & Constr. Trade
Council v. Mayor of Camden, 443 A.2d 148, 160 (NJ. 1982), rev'd, 465 U.S. 208
(1984).
84. For a further discussion of this inquiry, see supra notes 17-44 and accom-
panying text.
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a privilege or immunity fundamental to national unity.8 5 In cases involv-
ing resident preferences, this issue will turn upon whether there is discrim-
ination against a "common calling."8 6 Second, if such discrimination
exists, a court must consider the requirements set forth in Toomers two-
pronged test.87 The first prong requires the state to show a substantial
reason for the difference in treatment. This showing entails a demonstra-
tion that nonresidents "constitute a peculiar source of evil."8 8 The second
prong requires that this discrimination bear a substantial relationship to
the state's objectives, which involves consideration of the availability of less
restrictive means to further these ends.8 9
III. CIRCUIT COURT TREATMENT
In Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission of Montana, Justice Blackmun
noted that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV "is not one
of the contours" of the Constitution that has "been precisely shaped by the
process and wear of constant litigation and judicial interpretation."90
Consequently, circuit court case law addressing hiring preferences, includ-
ing the Third Circuit's, is relatively sparse. 9 1 However, in view of the prev-
alence of state and municipal hiring preference laws and the Supreme
85. For a discussion of fundamental interests and the scope of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, see supra notes 29-44 and accompanying text.
86. For a discussion of "common callings," see supra note 41 and accompany-
ing text.
87. For a discussion of Toomer generally, see supra notes 20-28 and accompa-
nying text.
88. For a discussion of the first prong of the Toomer test, see supra notes 24-25
and accompanying text.
89. For a discussion of the second prong of the Toomer test, see supra notes 26-
28 andr accompanying text.
90. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 379 (1978).
This part of the Casebrief will focus primarily upon hiring preferences. It is impor-
tant to note, however, that several other settings may invoke the protections of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause. See Smith Setzer & Sons, Inc. v. South Carolina
Procurement Review Panel, 20 F.3d 1311, 1316-17 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that
individual shareholder did not have standing under Privileges and Immunities
Clause where harm was to corporation); In re Merrill Lynch Relocation Manage-
ment, Inc., 812 F.2d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir. 1987) (upholding Oregon statute requir-
ing nonresident plaintiff's attorneys to post bond as justified in light of potential
difficulties in collecting costs); Aldering v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 779 F.2d
315, 317-18 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that participation in interscholastic sports is
not fundamental privilege within meaning of Privileges and Immunities Clause);
Silver v. Garcia, 760 F.2d 33, 36 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding that right of nonresidents
to act as insurance consultants is fundamental and protected under Privileges and
Immunities Clause); Smith v. Paulk, 705 F.2d 1279, 1285 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding
that one-year durational residency requirement to be licensed employment agency
violated Privileges and Immunities, but simple residency requirement did not vio-
late clause).
91. See Fourth Circuit Review for the Civil Practitioner, 51 WAsH. & LEE L. REv.
213, 259-63 (1994) (discussing recent Fourth Circuit holding in Tangier Sound
Waterman's Ass'n v. Pruitt, 4 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 1993)). This article summarizes
the relevant cases within the Courts of Appeals in just over one page of text and
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footnotes. Id. at 262-63. For a discussion of Tangier Sound, see infra notes 111-13
and accompanying text.
Nevertheless, several high state courts have addressed resident hiring prefer-
ences, with all but one invalidating the laws in question. For example, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in a detailed advisory opinion, found
that a proposed preference law would violate the Privileges and Immunities
Clause. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 469 N.E.2d 821, 826 (Mass. 1984).
The pending bill at issue in Opinion of the Justices would have required contractors
or subcontractors, "during periods of critical unemployment," to allot at least 80%
of the positions on state funded projects to Massachusetts residents. Id. at 822.
Thus, in some circumstances, the bill would compel private employers to hire
Commonwealth residents. Id.
The court initially recognized that the bill would burden a "protected privi-
lege," thus implicating the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id. at 823; see United
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 221 (1984)
(holding that employment with private employers is sufficiently basic to nation's
livelihood to be fundamental and within protection of clause). Finding that the
legislation burdened a fundamental interest, the court analyzed the bill under the
Privileges and Immunities framework of Toomer. Opinion of the Justices, 469 N.E.2d
at 823. In accordance with Toomer's test, the court first noted that there were no
factual records or legislative findings indicating a "substantial reason" for the dis-
crimination other than citizenship. Id. Moreover, the court did not find any indi-
cation that nonresidents constituted a "peculiar source of evil." Id. at 824 & n.5
(holding bill did not meet first prong of Toomer, requiring showing of "substantial
reason" for discrimination other than citizenship). Next, the court found that
even if it assumed a "substantial reason," the bill's degree of discrimination would
not be sufficiently related to this reason. Id. at 824-25.
The court then addressed the bill under the assumption that a nondiscrimina-
tory justification based upon increased employment opportunities for residents
could be shown. Id. at 825. The court noted that there was no assurance that the
extent of the preference (80%) bore a close relation to the reasons for the discrim-
ination. Id. at 824. The court also noted that the statute applied to all Massachu-
setts residents. Id. Thus, the bill would provide a preference to residents currently
employed and living in areas not suffering acute unemployment. Id. This finding
indicated that the degree of discrimination would not be closely related to the
bill's goals. Id. at 824-25; see Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 528 (1978) (holding
that state must closely tailor discriminatory act to aid those unemployed intended
to benefit from act). Thus, the bill failed to satisfy either prong of the Toomer test,
and would violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. Opinion of the
Justices, 469 N.E.2d at 824-25.
Finally, the Massachusetts court noted that its conclusion was consistent with
other jurisdictions' holdings. Id. at 825; see Robinson v. Francis, 713 P.2d 259, 266
(Alaska 1986) (invalidating statute on ground that state made no showing that
nonresidents constitute "peculiar source of the evil"); People ex rel Bernardi v.
Leary Constr. Co., 464 N.E.2d 1019, 1022 (Ill. 1984) (finding that state made no
showing that nonresident labor causes unemployment); Neshamity Constructors,
Inc. v. Krause, 437 A.2d 733, 738 (N.J. Ch. 1981) (holding that without showing
nonresidents constitute "specific dangers," state cannot discriminate); Salla v.
County of Monroe, 399 N.E.2d 909, 913-15 (N.Y. 1979) (holding that reducing
unemployment is legitimate interest, but state failed to show nonresidents caused
resident unemployment), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 909 (1980); Laborers Local 374 v.
Felton Constr. Co., 654 P.2d 67, 71 (Wash. 1982) (invalidating statute because state
did not demonstrate that nonresidents were a peculiar evil, or that statute was
"closely tailored" to achieving legitimate purpose); Hirsch, supra note 1, at 15-16
n.74 (citing state court decisions addressing preference laws); Day, supra note 1, at
272 nn.11-12 (same). The only state to reach a different conclusion is Wyoming.
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Court's recent jurisprudence under the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
such litigation is likely to increase in the future. 92
The Third Circuit recendy addressed the validity of a residency re-
quirement for public employment in Salem Blue Collar Workers Ass'n v. City
of Salem.93 In Salem, the Third Circuit addressed the constitutionality of a
Salem, New Jersey ordinance requiring that all Salem city employees be
residents of the city.94 The ordinance's stated purpose was not limited to
the alleviation of unemployment; the ordinance also aimed to improve the
quality of the city's services and work environment.9 5 The majority in
Salem held that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was inapplicable, de-
termining that there was no fundamental right to direct public
employment. 96
State v. Antonich, 694 P.2d 60 (Wyo. 1985). For a discussion of Antonich, see infra
note 126 and accompanying text.
92. For a discussion of the nature and prevalence of hiring preferences, see
supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence, see supra notes 17-89 and accompanying text.
93. 33 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1105 (1995). This sec-
tion of the Casebrief only discusses the basic facts and majority holding of Salem.
For a discussion of the majority's analysis and the dissent's disagreement with that
analysis, see infra notes 142-82 and accompanying text.
94. Salem 33 F.3d at 266. The ordinance required "all full-time permanent
and full-time, part-time officers and employees hereinafter to be employed by the
City of Salem, are hereby required as a condition of their employment to have
their place of abode in the City of Salem and be a bona fide domiciliary therein."
Id. at 266-67; see also Salem Blue Collar Workers Ass'n v. City of Salem, 832 F. Supp.
852, 854-55 (D.N.J. 1993) (detailing related municipal ordinances and state stat-
utes), aff'd, 33 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1105 (1995). The
appellants challenged the ordinance on the grounds of the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause of Article IV and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Salem, 33 F.3d at 267. The appellants were a former
Salem city employee who was dismissed for violating'the ordinance after moving
from Salem to suburban New Jersey, and the collective bargaining agent for the
blue-collar and clerical workers in the city - the Salem Blue Collar Workers Asso-
ciation. Id. at 266-67.
95. Salem, 33 F.3d at 267. The ordinance's asserted purpose was as follows:
Whereas, said residency will not only reduce the high unemployment rate
in the City, but will also improve relations among City employees; en-
hance the quality of employee performance by greater personal knowl-
edge of conditions and problems in the City; promote a feeling of greater
personal interest in the City's progress; reduce the possibility of tardiness
and absenteeism; provide a ready availability of trained manpower for
emergency situations; and provide unto the City economic benefits ....
Id. (citing Joint Appendix at 25).
96. Id. at 270. The court also upheld the ordinance against Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process Clause challenges. Id. at 271-73.
However, ChiefJudge Sloviter dissented, believing the majority read the Privileges
and Immunities Clause and relevant case law too narrowly. Id. at 273 (Sloviter,
C.J., dissenting). The Chief Judge also noted that the ordinance's validity under
the Equal Protection Clause was questionable, and that the case at bar may have
involved selective enforcement in violation of the Due Process Clause. Id. at 276-
77 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
1995]
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The Third Circuit majority stated that a claim under the Privileges
and Immunities Clause requires proof that a fundamental interest or right
of citizenship is burdened. 97 If a fundamental right or privilege is bur-
dened, the court must then determine whether the degree of discrimina-
tion is closely related to "substantial reasons" for the discrimination.98
In Salem, the court began this analysis by distinguishing the Supreme
Court's holding in Camden.99 The Third Circuit stressed that the instant
case dealt with direct city employment, while Camden addressed only indi-
rect city employment. 10 0 The Salem majority further emphasized that
Camden's ordinance touched workers seeking employment with private
employers contracting with the city of Camden, while the Salem ordinance
affected only workers directly employed by the city. 10 1 The majority con-
cluded that because there was no historically recognized fundamental
right to direct public employment, the Privileges and Immunities protec-
tion did not apply. 0 2
97. Id. at 268 (citing Baldwin v. Fish Game Comm'n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371,
383 (1978), for proposition that only "fundamental" rights are within protection of
Privileges and Immunities Clause). The Salem majority first determined that the
individual appellant lacked standing because he was a New Jersey resident, but
concluded that the Association could proceed because its members included non-
residents. Id. at 267-68. For a discussion of "fundamental" rights with respect to
Article IV Privileges and Immunities, see supra notes 29-44 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of standing to proceed under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, see supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
98. Id. at 268. Thus, the Third Circuit's analysis began with a threshold deter-
mination of whether the ordinance implicated the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, and then turned to whether application of Toomers two-pronged test was
appropriate. Id. For a discussion of the Toomer test, see supra notes 20-28 and
accompanying text.
99. Id. at 268, 270 (noting that threshold issue is whether right to work for city
is sufficiently fundamental to implicate Privileges and Immunities Clause).
100. Id. at 270 ("Our case is distinguishable by comparing the direct and indi-
rect nature of the government employment.").
101. Id. at 269-70. The Third Circuit majority specifically noted that the Sa-
lem ordinance concerned only employment directly with the government entity.
Id. at 270. For example, the individual appellant in this case worked for the Salem
Water and Sewerage Department. Salem Blue Collar Workers Ass'n v. City of Sa-
lem, 832 F. Supp. 832, 855 (D.N.J. 1993), aff'd, 33 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1105 (1995). In contrast, both White and Camden involved em-
ployment with private firms that contracted or subcontracted for city construction
projects. Salem 33 F.3d at 270. For a discussion of White, see supra notes 64-69 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of Canden, see supra notes 70-89 and accom-
panying text.
102. Sale, 33 F.3d at 270. The majority stated that because the ordinance
did not implicate a fundamental right, the court did not have to consider "substan-
tial relatedness." Id. However, in a footnote, the court noted that the Privileges
and Immunities Clause is not absolute. Id. at 270 n.6 (citing Toomer v. Witsell,
334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948)). For a discussion of the validity and history of this dis-
tinction, see supra notes 55-58 and infra notes 142-82 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 40: p. 803
18
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol40/iss3/12
CASEBRIEF
Similarly, in O'Reilly v. Board of Appeals,'0 3 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the County Board of Appeals for
Montgomery County, Maryland, violated the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV in granting taxi licenses for the county.' 0 4 The court
found that the county denied the plaintiff's license application because he
was a resident of a neighboring Virginia county and not a resident of
Montgomery County. 10 5 The court further concluded that this discrimi-
nation was not closely related to the asserted goal of providing efficient
taxi service.
1 06
The O'Reilly court's analysis followed the Supreme Court's application
of the Toomer test.10 7 The Fourth Circuit in O'Reilly called for a two-step
analysis in assessing the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause claim:
first, the court must determine whether a fundamental privilege or immu-
nity is involved; 10 8 and second, it must determine whether the restriction
is " 'closely related to the advancement of a substantial state interest.' "109
Under this approach, the Fourth Circuit found that driving a taxi was a
fundamental privilege, and that the state failed to demonstrate that the
103. 942 F.2d 281 (4th Cir. 1991) (reversing district court's granting of sum-
mary judgment for defendant board).
104. Id. at 284-85. The Board reconsidered all "passenger Vehicle Licenses"
granted by the county transportation department following an appeal by unsuc-
cessful applicants. Id. at 282. The Board considered several factors in deciding
whom should receive licenses, including familiarity with the county. Id. The
Board deemed experience as a taxi driver in the area or long-time residency to be
indicative of "familiarity" with the area. Id.
105. Id. The transportation department originally granted O'Reilly a license.
Id. Upon review, however, the Board rejected his application. Id. All persons
granted licenses were Maryland residents, and several had less experience as taxi
drivers in the area than O'Reilly - a Virginia resident. Id.
Ultimately, O'Reilly challenged his denial in federal court. Id. at 283 (chal-
lenging denial under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which encompasses Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause violations). The Board defended its decision, claiming that residency
was not the sole factor in its determination. Id. at 284. The court rejected this
argument, finding that residency was the "sole factor on which differentiation
could be made.., on the basis of the information before the Board." Id.
106. Id. at 284-85. The court found that the Board failed to present evidence
establishing that familiarity with the area is closely related to the goal of efficient
service. Id. at 285. Additionally, even if the Board satisfied this requirement, the
Board did not establish that there were no less discriminatory means available to
determine the applicant's familiarity with the area. Id. at 285; see Supreme Court
of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 69 (1988) (noting that "other equally or more
effective means that do not themselves infringe constitutional protections" could
protect state concerns). The court stressed that O'Reilly submitted unchallenged
affidavits indicating that similar jurisdictions administered written tests to deter-
mine the applicants' familiarity with the area. O'Reilly, 942 F.2d at 285.
107. For a discussion of Toomer and the Toomer test, see supra notes 20-28 and
accompanying text.
108. O'Reilly, 942 F.2d at 284 (citing United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v.
Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 221-22 (1984)).
109. Id. (quoting Friedman, 487 U.S. at 64).
1995]
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Board's license approval process was "closely related" to the state's as-
serted interest in providing efficient taxi service. 110
Following its decision in O'Reilly, the Fourth Circuit reached a similar
conclusion in Tangier Sound Waterman's Ass'n v. Pruitt.11 In Tangier Sound,
the court held that a Virginia licensing scheme that charged much greater
fees to nonresident commercial fisherman than to Virginians violated the
Privileges and Immunities Clause.11 2 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that
commercial fishing was a "common calling" and that the state's nonresi-
dent licensing fee was not sufficiently related to the state's asserted inter-
est in protecting Virginia's taxpayers.11
Likewise, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
assessed a challenge to an Illinois hiring preference law under both the
Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause in WC.M.
Window Co. v. Bernardi.1 14 In WC.M. Window, the Illinois statute in ques-
tion prohibited the hiring of nonresidents for public works projects unless
there were no suitable Illinois residents. 1 5 The dispute in WC.M. Window
arose when an Illinois general contractor hired a Missouri subcontractor
to replace windows on a school building in Illinois.11 6 Ultimately, the
court found that the statute violated both the Commerce and Privileges
and Immunities Clauses.11 7
110. Id. at 284-85.
111. 4 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 1993).
112. Id. at 265-68. In Tangier Sound, the Fourth Circuit addressed the validity
of a Virginia statute that tripled the "harvester's license fee" for nonresident com-
mercial fishermen. Id. at 265. Virginia defended this statute by asserting that it
served the substantial interest of preventing Virginia's taxpayers from subsidizing
the costs of nonresident fishermen. Id. at 267. However, the court found that the
statute was not "closely related" to the advancement of the state's asserted interests,
and therefore imposed impermissible burdens on the privileges and immunities of
nonresident fishermen. Id.
113. Id. at 266-68. The court noted that Toomer actually entails two require-
ments for justifying discrimination under Privileges and Immunities Clause analy-
sis: (1) there must be a substantial state interest, and (2) the discrimination must
be "closely related" to that interest. Id. at 267. Tangier Sound did not reach the
issue of whether the asserted purpose was "substantial," because the statute was not
closely related to this end. Id. at 267-68.
114. 730 F.2d 486, 489 (7th Cir. 1984).
115. Id. The Illinois' Preference to Citizens on Public Works Project Act
provided:
[a contractor on] any public works project or improvement for the State
of Illinois or any political subdivision . . . thereof shall employ only Illi-
nois laborers . . ., [unless the contractor certifies, and the contracting
officer finds, that Illinois laborers either] are not available or incapable of
performing the particular type of work involved.
Id. (quoting ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, para. 269-74 (1981)).
116. Id. at 489-90.
117. Id. at 496, 498. The court initially considered whether the district court
should have abstained from hearing this case. Id. at 490-93. The court held that
although Bernardi, the Director of the Illinois Department of Labor, brought an
action in state court, the district court properly heard the case. Id. at 490, 493; see
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971) (holding that federal district court may
[Vol. 40: p. 803
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In WC.M. Window, the court first addressed the Commerce Clause
challenge,' 18 distinguishing White on the grounds that the instant case did
not involve the expenditure of state funds. 1 9 The court noted that the
"market participant" was the local school board, with the state acting
purely as a market regulator.120 Accordingly, the court concluded that
extending the market participant doctrine to situations like the present
case "would do great damage to the principles of free trade" on which the
Dormant Commerce Clause is premised. 12 1
Although this finding resolved the case, the Seventh Circuit reviewed
the Privileges and Immunities claim because of the close relation between
the two clauses. 12 2 Initially, the court recognized that reducing unemploy-
ment amongst citizens may be a "valid ground" for discrimination. 12 3
not enjoin state criminal proceeding in civil rights suit if federal claims can be
raised in state court as defense to prosecution); see also Middlesex County Ethics
Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1982) (noting that Younger
doctrine may include civil proceeding involving important state interests). The
court based this holding upon a -ieighing of the equities and a conclusion that the
state courts may not provide a remedy for the plaintiffs. WC.M. Window, 730 F.2d
at 493.
118. WC.M. Window, 730 F.2d at 494-96. For a discussion of the Commerce
Clause with respect to hiring preferences, see supra notes 59-75 and accompanying
text.
119. Id. at 495. The court noted that the decentralized school systems in Illi-
nois granted the local school board considerable autonomy. Id. Additionally, a
school superintendent's uncontroverted affidavit stated that no state money was to
be used for the project in question. Id. In contrast, the Mayor of Boston's order in
White affected city projects that were at least partially funded with city money.
White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 205 n.1, 210.
For a discussion of White, see supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
120. WC.M. Window, 730 F.2d at 495.
121. Id. at 496.
122. Id. For a discussion of the historic origins of both the Commerce Clause
and the Privileges and Immunities Clause, see supra notes 13-16 and accompanying
text.
123. Id. at 497. The Seventh Circuit recognized that the Supreme Court's
remand in Camden implicitly allowed the City of Camden to discriminate in order
to reduce unemployment, if it could justify its measures. Id. The Supreme Court
reinforced this notion, recognizing that states should be given "considerable lee-
way" in remedying local "evils." Id.; see United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v.
Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 222-23 (1984) (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334
U.S. 385, 396 (1948) (stating there must be ".... due regard for the principle that
the States should have considerable leeway in analyzing local evils and in prescrib-
ing appropriate cures"). For a discussion of Camden, see supra notes 70-89 and
accompanying text.
The WC.M. Window court went on to express grave concerns as to whether
such legislation would succeed on the merits. WC.M. Window, 730 F.2d at 498. In
discussing the Commerce Clause, the court anticipated the potential for retaliatory
preference laws - stating that the "cumulative effects... [of such laws] could be
staggering." Id. at 494. The court also noted that there could be a boomerang
effect, which would increase unemployment by making projects less economically
attractive. Id. at 498. For example, the Illinois preference law could increase labor
costs and ultimately, lead school districts to abandon construction projects and
reduce employment. Id.
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However, rather than explicitly setting forth a standard or test for evaluat-
ing a Privileges and Immunities claim, the court spoke of shifting "bur-
dens."1 24 Under this analysis, the court determined (1) that the plaintiff
established discrimination against nonresidents pursuing common call-
ings, 12 5 and (2) that the state failed to present evidence justifying this
discrimination. 12
6
124. WC.M. Window, 730 F.2d at 498. The court stated that the plaintiff has
the initial burden of showing the "statute discriminates explicitly against nonresi-
dents 'in the pursuit of common callings.'" Id. (quoting Baldwin v. Fish & Game
Comm'n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 387 (1978)). Essentially, the court looked to
whether the statute implicated a fundamental right or privilege. For a discussion
of "fundamental" rights under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, see supra
notes 29-44 and accompanying text. If the plaintiff meets his or her initial burden,
the burden shifts to the state to justify the discrimination. Id. The court would
presumably require the state to satisfy the Toomer test in order to uphold this stat-
ute. For a discussion of the Toomer test and its application, see supra notes 20-28
and accompanying text.
125. W.C.M. Window, 730 F.2d at 498. The court did not discuss "common
callings," but merely referred to them in passing. Id. However, earlier Supreme
Court cases indicate, that working on public construction projects is a "common
calling" and thus, protected under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See, e.g.,
Camden, 465 U.S. at 221-22. For a discussion of "common callings," see supra note
41 and accompanying text.
126. WC.M. Window, 730 F.2d at 498 (holding that state failed to present justi-
fication despite opportunity). The Supreme Court of Wyoming reached a diamet-
rically opposed conclusion on nearly identical facts in State v. Antonich, 694 P.2d
60 (Wyo. 1985). In Antonichk the Wyoming court's Privileges and Immunities anal-
ysis stressed that Toomer required states be given "considerable leeway' as to their
analysis of perceived "local evils" and "appropriate cures." Id. at 61-62 (quoting
Toomer, 334 U.S. at 396); see Toomer, 334 U.S. at 396 (holding that Privileges and
Immunities Clause is not absolute and appropriate tests for measuring discrimina-
tion are (1) whether valid reasons for discrimination exist, and (2) whether degree
of discrimination closely relates to those reasons). Applying this standard, the
court deferred to the statute's stated purpose and found that Wyoming laborers
remaining unemployed while nonresidents worked on public works projects con-
stituted a "peculiar source of evil." Antonich, 694 P.2d at 62. The opinion cited no
facts or findings indicating nonresidents were actually keeping residents from
working, but merely recited the statute's asserted purpose. Id. One commentator
criticized this aspect of the court's opinion because this deference to the statute's
stated purpose represents a lack of evidence that was fatal in other cases. See
Hirsch, supra note 1, at 17 (stating that this decision "seems flawed by the court's
easy acceptance of Wyoming's justification ... in the face of a lack of evidence").
Additionally, the Wyoming Supreme Court stated that the statute was closely
related to the "unquestionably" valid state goal of reducing unemployment.
Antonich, 694 P.2d at 62. However, as the Seventh Circuit noted, this proposition is
not as clear as the Wyoming court indicated. WC.M. Window, 730 F.2d at 497
(stating that benefits of Illinois' preference law could "not be assumed"); see also
Camden, 465 U.S. at 222-23 (holding that record was insufficient to determine
whether preference law that purported to "counteract grave economic and social
ills" was justifiable).
Interestingly, the Antonich court made no mention of WC.M. Window, which
invalidated a nearly identical statute. See WC.M. Window, 730 F.2d at 497-98. In
WC.M. Window, the Seventh Circuit's holding rested upon the notion that the
state had to make some showing to justify its discrimination. Id.; see Hirsch, supra
note 1, at 17 (noting WC.M. Window's focus on economic efficiency of preference
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The Ninth Circuit never reached such a Privileges and Immunities
Clause analysis in International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots v. An-
drews.12 7 In Andrews, the court addressed the validity of an Alaskan statute
seeking to equalize pay between resident and nonresident employees of
the Alaska Marine Highway System.128 The court found that the statute
did not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause because the appel-
lants failed to show that the statute "interfere[d] with interstate relations
or with the freedom of nonresidents" to work or live in Alaska.129 Accord-
ingly, the court did not engage in a Privileges and Immunities Clause anal-
ysis because there was no discrimination that the state had to justify.13 0
law). However, the Antonich opinion did not mention any such showing and sim-
ply deferred to the legislature's stated purpose. Antonich, 694 P.2d at 62 (deferring
to stated purpose in finding nonresidents were source of evil); see Hirsch, supra
note 1, at 17-18 (criticizing Antonich and stating that "[W.CM. Window] represents
a move to a more analytically sound and practical test for justifying [state prefer-
ence laws] under the substantial reason test").
The Wyoming court went on to distinguish its case from Hicklin v. Orbeck,
437 U.S. 518 (1978). The Antonich court stated that the Supreme Court invali-
dated the Alaska Hire Act in Hicklin because Alaska's statute went well beyond the
"activities in which the state held a substantial interest." Antonich, 694 P.2d at 63.
The Wyoming court stated that in contrast to Hicklin, the legislature tailored Wyo-
ming's act to the identified evil and limited it to specific areas of unemployment.
Id. Thus, the Wyoming court concluded that this statute bore a close relation to
the evil represented by nonresidents. Id. at 64.
127. 831 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 962 (1988).
128. Id. at 845. The court summarized the statute to require:
that every labor agreement between public employers in Alaska and any
labor organization provide that wages of nonresident employees not in-
crease until the difference between wages paid to residents and wages
paid to nonresidents "reflects the differences between the cost of living in
Alaska and the cost of living in Seattle, Washington."
Id. (quoting ALAsKA STAT. § 23.40.210 (1977)). The plaintiffs in Andrews were a
union that represented employees of the Alaska Marine Highway System (AMHS)
and individual AMHS workers. Id. at 844. These plaintiffs included Washington
state residents. Id. The parties incorporated the preceding statute into the labor
agreements between the relevant unions and the AMHS. Id. at 845.
129. Id. at 846. The court ended its inquiry with the determination that there
was no showing that the statute "prevented or discouraged" nonresidents from
working for the AMHS. Id. Additionally, the court noted that the statute actually
enhanced the attractiveness of hiring nonresidents because the statute made such
hiring less expensive. Id. Similarly, the appellants' challenge under the right to
interstate travel also failed because the statute did not affect their freedom to travel
from Washington to Alaska. Id. Additionally, the court rejected a Commerce
Clause claim because the appellants failed to state a cause of action under that
clause. Id.
130. Id.; see Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 263 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding
ordinance restricting "cruising" through town did not discriminate against nonres-
idents); In re Merrill Lynch Relocation Management, Inc., 812 F.2d 1116, 1122
(9th Cir. 1987) (holding that Oregon statute requiring resident attorney repre-
senting nonresident plaintiffs to post bond did not discriminate against
nonresidents).
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IV. EXAMINATION OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT DECISION IN SALF.& BLUE
CoLAR WoRKEs Ass v v C7 oF SALEM
The Salem decision represents the Third Circuit's only exposition on
the Privileges and Immunities Clause with respect to hiring prefer-
ences.' 3 1 This is hardly surprising given the infrequency of the clause's
use and the relative novelty of hiring preference legislation.' 3 2 Neverthe-
less, the Salem opinion presents several interesting interpretations of
Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area.'3 3
A. Facts and Procedural History
Salem sprang from a challenge to an ordinance requiring Salem, New
Jersey's city workers to reside within the city.134 The individual plaintiff
was a worker who moved from the city to suburban New Jersey to ensure
the "safety and welfare of his family."' 35 Although the city notified the
worker that his actions violated the ordinance, he did not move back to
Salem and was consequently terminated.' 3 6
Following his termination, the worker and the union that represented
him filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey.'3 7 The plaintiffs alleged that the ordinance violated several provi-
sions of the Constitution, including the Privileges and Immunities Clause
and the Commerce Clause.' 3 8 After examining relevant case law, the dis-
trict court concluded that Salem's residency requirement did not violate
the Constitution and granted summary judgment in favor of the city.13 9
The plaintiffs appealed to the Third Circuit from this decision. 140 On ap-
peal, the majority of a three judge panel affirmed the district court.' 4 1
131. Salem Blue Collar Workers Ass'n v. City of Salem, 33 F.3d 265, 273 (3d
Cir. 1994) (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting) (stating that this case was apparently issue "of
first impression" for Third Circuit), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1105 (1995).
132. For a discussion of the infrequency of litigation under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, see supra notes 17 & 90-92 and accompanying text.
133. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's interpretations, see supra notes
13-89 and accompanying text.
134. Salem Blue Collar Workers Ass'n v. City of Salem, 832 F. Supp. 852, 854
(D.N.J. 1993). For a more detailed discussion of the facts of the Salem decision, see
supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
135. Salem, 33 F.3d at 266-67.
136. Id.
137. Salem, 832 F. Supp. at 854-55.
138. Id. at 854.
139. Id. at 855-65.
140. Salem, 33 F.3d at 266.
141. Id. at 273. Subsequently, the Third Circuit denied a petition for rehear-
ing. Id. at 277. For a discussion of the substantive holding of the majority in the
Third Circuit's decision, see supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text. For a dis-
cussion of the majority's and the dissent's analyses, see infra notes 142-82 and ac-
companying text.
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B. Third Circuit Analysis in Salem
In Salem, Judge Seitz joined by Judge Hutchinson formed the major-
ity, while Chief Judge Sloviter dissented.14 2 Notably, the judges markedly
disagreed on the appropriate reading of the Supreme Court's decision in
United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden.14 3 Essen-
tially, the majority read Camden as an affirmance of the notion that there is
no fundamental right to public employment. 144 In contrast, the dissent
viewed Camden as an expansion of the Privileges and Immunities Clause's
protections, aimed at removing the "obstacles erected by parochialism."1 45
The majority in Salem first attempted to limit "privileges" and "immu-
nities" to a commercial context.1 4 6 The court emphasized the "mutually
reinforcing relationship" of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the
Commerce Clause and the commercial nature of "common callings."
147
In contrast to the majority, the dissent set forth the broad purpose under-
lying the Privileges and Immunities Clause - that of fusing the sovereign
states into "one Nation."148 From this perspective, the majority's analysis
was much more narrow than that of the dissent.14 9
The majority next referred to dicta from White, which noted that em-
ployees of independent contractors on city projects were "working for the
city.' 5 0 From this dicta, the majority concluded that the workers in White
did not have "the benefit of the Privileges and Immunities Clause when
Boston favored its own citizens."' 51 This conclusion constituted a broad
leap because the Supreme Court expressly declined to address the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause in White. 152 Additionally, the quoted refer-
ence originated in a footnote explicitly limited to the context of the
142. Id. at 266, 273.
143. 465 U.S. 208 (1984). For a discussion of Camden, see supra notes 70-89
and accompanying text.
144. Salem, 33 F.3d at 269-70 (holding that "the public/private distinction has
not been abandoned").
145. Id. at 273 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting) (stating that Camden "significantly
expanded the scope of the Privileges and Immunities Clause").
146. Id. at 268.
147. Id. For a discussion of the historical origins of the Commerce Clause
and of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, see supra notes 13-16 and accompany-
ing text. For a discussion of "common callings" and "fundamental privileges and
immunities" under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, see supra notes 29-44
and accompanying text.
148. Id. at 273 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S.
385, 395 (1948)).
149. For a discussion of the dissent's analysis in Salem, see infra notes 169-79
and accompanying text.
150. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 211
n.7 (noting that Mayor's executive order reached distinct class of activity in which,
in an "informal sense," those affected were "working for the city").
151. Salem, 33 F.3d at 269.
152. White, 460 U.S. at 214 n.12 (remanding without considering Privileges
and Immunities Clause).
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Commerce Clause. 153 The Salem majority's conclusion also runs counter
to language in Camden, which states that determining whether a privilege
is fundamental does not turn upon whether the employees of a contractor
can be said to be "working for the city."'1 5 4
The Salem majority subsequently set forth its analysis of Camden.155
First, the court acknowledged that the Camden Court refused to follow
White's Commerce Clause analysis in the context of a Privileges and Immu-
nities challenge. 156 The majority also recognized that the Supreme Court
stated that public employment is a "subspecies of the broader opportunity
to pursue a common calling." 15 7 Despite the contrary implications from
these quotations, the majority read Camden to remove the public employ-
ment at issue in Salem from the purview of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause. 158
The majority bolstered its reading of Camden through an examination
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause's historical origin in the Fourth
Article of the Articles of Confederation. 159 The majority noted the com-
mercial language of that Article and quoted several commentators to sup-
port its contention that the clause does not protect public employment.
160
The quoted language is somewhat misleading, however, because while the
language indicates that "trades" and "businesses" are included within the
purview of the clause, the clause's protection extends beyond these
areas. 
161
153. Id. at 204, 211 n.7 (stating that "Commerce Clause does not require the
city to stop at the boundary of formal privity").
154. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S.
208, 221 (1984).
155. Salem, 33 F.3d at 269-70.
156. Id. at 269 (noting that challenging Association contended this rejection
constituted rejection of distinction between public and private); see Camden, 465
U.S. at 219 (declining to mechanically transfer Commerce Clause analysis).
157. Salem, 33 F.3d at 269 (quoting Camden, 465 U.S. at 219).
158. Id. at 269-70 (upholding distinction between public and private based on
historical and factual differences).
159. Id. at 269. For a discussion of the historical origins of the clause in the
Articles of Confederation, see supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
160. Id. at 269-70 (stating that "Article [Four of Articles of Confederation]
used terms that were referable to private employment, e.g., 'trade' and
'commerce' 
").
161. Id. at 270. The court cited Bogen, for the proposition that "'[d]espite
uncertainty, one function of article IV... remained clear: it prohibited states from
imposing any restriction not applicable to residents on nonresidents engaged in
trade or commerce.'" Id. (citing Bogen, supra note 15, at 831). However, when
read in context, the quoted material stands for Bogen's proposition that the Conti-
nental Congress never defined "privileges" and "immunities," nor did it have the
power to enforce the Article. Bogen, supra note 15, at 831. Therefore, the Arti-
cle's reach was unclear. Id. Notwithstanding, Bogen notes the Fourth Article did
reach trade and commerce, and that the rampant violation of this article was of
great concern to the Framers. Id. (citing NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CON-
VENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BYJAMES MADISON 14 (A. Koch ed., 1966)).
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Moreover, the Salem majority ignored the Founders' ultimate separa-
tion of the Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause in
the Constitution. 162 Additionally, the majority failed to recognize that the
clauses are different in both application and scope. 163 As the Supreme
Court has noted on several occasions, the Commerce Clause limits a state's
power to regulate, while the Privileges and Immunities Clause acts as "a
The majority stated that the language of the Fourth Article of the Articles of
Confederation provided the "historical basis" that makes "the distinction between
public and private employment... viable .... " Salem, 33 F.3d at 270. Immediately
after this statement, the majority parenthetically cited Day for the proposition that
the Supreme Court distinguishes between private and government employment.
Day, supra note 1, at 278. However, the student note only supports this proposition
with cases upholding residency requirements under the Equal Protection Clause.
Id.
The Salem majority cited Bogen's statement that engaging in a trade or busi-
ness is a protected privilege or immunity, and argued that this statement sup-
ported the distinction between public and private. Salem, 33 F.3d at 270 (citing
Bogen, supra note 15, at 856). This citation seems particularly inappropriate, be-
cause there is no question that the Privileges and Immunities Clause protects non-
residents' pursuit of trade or business or common callings. See, e.g., Ward v.
Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1870) (holding that Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause "plainly and unmistakably" protects rights of noncitizens to engage in
"lawful commerce, trade or business"). Additionally, the section of Bogen's article
from which this statement originated did not mention public employment, but
demonstrated the disagreement over the meaning of "privilege or immunity"
amongst the Justices of the United States Supreme Court. Bogen, supra note 15, at
856-63.
Finally, the majority parenthetically cited Gergen to support its contention
that "early cases striking down state laws under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause involved the 'core privileges of trade and commerce.'" Salem, 33 F.3d at
270 (citing Gergen, supra note 3, at 1129). The most interesting aspect of this
citation is its failure to mention that the very sentence quoted refers to protected
privileges outside commerce - cases involving "an alien friend." Gergen, supra
note 3, at 1129. Further, this citation also ignores the broad language of Corfield
v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1832), in which Justice Washington
indicated that "privileges and immunities" included all rights "which are in their
nature fundamental." For a discussion of "common callings" and fundamental
rights, see supra notes 29-44 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Corfield,
see supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
162. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 & art. IV, § 2, cl. 1, with ARTicLES OF
CONFEDERATION art. IV. The Supreme Court suggested that this separation may be
due to concern that the Commerce Clause would be read too narrowly. Baldwin v.
Fish & Game Comm'n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 379-80 (1978).
163. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S.
208, 220 (1984) (holding that White's Commerce Clause analysis not dispositive
because Privileges and Immunities Clause has "different aims" and "standards for
state conduct"); Bernardi v. Leary Constr. Co., 464 N.E.2d 1019 (Ill. 1984) (hold-
ing Commerce Clause "market participant" exception not relevant to Privileges
and Immunities Clause challenge); Eule, supra note 3, at 447-48 (arguing that Priv-
ileges and Immunities Clause was originally intended to provide protection subse-
quently p laced in Dormant Commerce Clause). But see Polelle, supra note 16, at
677-82 (criticizing such distinctions between Clauses because constitutionality
turns on characterization of challenge). For a discussion of the varying applica-
tions in White and in Camden, see supra notes 64-89 and accompanying text.
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direct restraint on state action in the interest of interstate harmony." '6 4
Thus, the Privileges and Immunities Clause gives rise to concerns that
both cut across distinctions and that are crucial to a Commerce Clause
analysis. 1
6 5
Finally, the Third Circuit in Salem upheld the Salem ordinance based
upon its view that a distinction between public and private employment
survived Camden.166 Judge Seitz noted that the determinative factor in this
analysis is the employee's relationship to the employer, not the nature of
the employee's work.167 Therefore, because the plaintiffs in Salem worked
directly for the city and not for a private employer, the ordinance did not
implicate the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 168
The dissent did not accept the majority's rationale. 169 Chief Judge
Sloviter viewed the majority's opinion as resting upon notions of "public
ownership" - notions that the Supreme Court has consistently rejected as
insufficient to justify such discrimination. 170 More fundamentally, the
Chief Judge believed that the majority opinion set forth an overly narrow
view of the Camden decision. 17 1 Furthermore, Chief Judge Sloviter as-
serted that Camden did not provide a basis for restricting the scope of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause.' 72 Rather, Camden applied the Privi-
164. Camden, 465 U.S. at 220. For a discussion of the historical origins of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Commerce Clause, see supra notes 13-16
and accompanying text.
165. Id. at 220.
166. Salem, 33 F.3d at 270.
167. Id. The majority stated that its primary concern was not whether the
case involved public or private employment. Id. Instead, the question turned
upon "the nature of the employment relationship between employer and em-
ployee, not the character of the job being performed." Id. Finally, the majority
concluded that Camden recognized the distinction between public and private em-
ployment, holding that the right to work for private employers was "sufficiently
fundamental" to fall within the clause's protection. Id. However, in Camden, Jus-
tice Rehnquist did not mention direct public employment and discussed only the
right "to seek employment with . . .pnvate employers." Camden, 465 U.S. at 221.
168. Salem, 33 F.3d at 270. Because the majority found there was no funda-
mental right implicated, it did not address the reasons or "substantial relatedness"
of the city's ordinance. Id. However, the majority noted that states should be
given considerable leeway in determining the appropriate means to combat "local
evils." Id. at 270 n.6; see Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948) (stating that
Privileges and Immunities Clause is not absolute and states should be given consid-
erable leeway). Additionally, the majority concluded that if a Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause analysis was necessary, the case would require a remand. Salem, 33
F.3d at 270 n.6; see Camden, 465 U.S. at 223 (remanding due to lack of factual
findings).
169. Salem, 33 F.3d at 273. (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting) (stating "the majority's
conclusion does not follow from Camden").
170. Id. at 274 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting). For a discussion of Supreme Court
holdings regarding state ownership of its resources, see supra notes 55-58 and ac-
companying text.
171. Id. at 273, 275 (Sloviter, CJ., dissenting) (stating Camden expanded
scope of Privileges and Immunities Clause and should be read broadly).
172. Id. at 273 (Sloviter, C.J. dissenting).
[Vol. 40: p. 803
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leges and Immunities Clause to municipal hiring preferences, while deny-
ing similar applicability for the Commerce Clause. 173
Accordingly, the Chief Judge stressed that Camden's expansion of the
clause's reach suggests that the Supreme Court would not follow the Salem
majority's restrictive interpretation.17 4 She concluded that Camden's hold-
ing rested upon the clause's "raison d'etre."175 Therefore, in evaluating the
Privileges and Immunities Clause challenge, the dissent looked to the ex-
tent of discrimination against nonresidents.1 76 To illustrate this point, the
Chief Judge cited Bureau of Labor statistics demonstrating the quantita-
tive extent and economic importance of public employment.1 77 The
Chief Judge concluded from these statistics that public employment
should be protected under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.1 78 Fi-
nally, the Chief Judge concluded that the majority's analysis prematurely
foreclosed a substantial number of jobs from nonresidents for "what may
be insubstantial reasons."179
173. Id. at 275 (Sloviter, CJ., dissenting). The dissent noted that the
Supreme Court determined that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was applica-
ble even though the City of Camden was "merely setting conditions on its expendi-
tures" of its own funds. Id. (Sloviter, CJ., dissenting) (quoting Camden, 465 U.S. at
220). Also, the dissent stressed that Camden held the Privileges and Immunities
Clause applicable, while recognizing that there was no fundamental right to gov-
ernment employment under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. (Sloviter, CJ., dis-
senting) (citing Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313
(1976) (per curiam); Camden, 465 U.S. at 219). Thus, validity under the Com-
merce Clause or Equal Protection Clause did not preclude a Privileges and Immu-
nities challenge. Id. (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 276 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
175. Id. (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting). Raison d'etre is defined as the "reason or
justification for existence." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 973
(1987). Consequendy, the dissent viewed Camden as emphasizing the underlying
purposes of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Salem, 33 F.3d at 275 (Sloviter,
C.J., dissenting). In fact, the dissent quoted Camden for the proposition that" '[i] t
is discrimination against out-of-state residents on matters of fundamental concern
which triggers the Clause .... ' " Id. (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Camden,
465 U.S. at 220). For this reason, Chief Judge Sloviter read Camden to require an
examination of preferences' effects on "national unity" and "fundamental inter-
ests." Id. at 273, 275 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
176. Salem, 33 F.3d at 276 (Sloviter, CJ., dissenting).
177. Id. (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Judge noted the undisputed
expansion of public employment in recent years. Id. (Sloviter, CJ., dissenting). In
fact, the statistics cited indicated that one-sixth of all jobs in New Jersey and one-
fifth of all jobs in the United States are "public." Id. (Sloviter, CJ., dissenting).
These proportions translated to over 500,000 public employees in New Jersey and
over 18 million throughout the United States. Id. (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
178. Id. (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting). The ChiefJudge recognized that this con-
clusion would not end the inquiry under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id.
(Sloviter, C.J., dissenting). The conclusion merely meant that the two-pronged test
announced in Toomerwould have to be applied. Id. (Sloviter, CJ., dissenting). For
a discussion of the Toomer analysis, see supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text.
179. Id. at 276 (Sloviter, CJ., dissenting). In concluding the first part of her
dissent, the Chief Judge stated the majority's analysis was "incompatible with the
Privileges and Immunities Clause." Id. (Sloviter, CJ., dissenting). Chief Judge
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Public employment constitutes a much larger portion of available jobs
than other "common calling" employment previously held fundamen-
tal.180 In Salem, there was no distinction between "common callings," pro-
tected under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and those jobs falling
under the ordinance at issue - except the occupation's relationship with
the municipality.18 1 Although this distinction may ultimately be signifi-
cant, such a distinction should not foreclose the analysis under the guid-
ing principles of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.18 2
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has yet to clearly define the scope of the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. This is particularly true of the
clause's influence upon state and municipal hiring preferences. Although
the Court is clearly concerned with overt discrimination against nonresi-
dents, it has not delineated exactly what evidence a state must produce to
justify preference laws. The stark disagreement between the majority and
dissent in Salem Blue Collar Workers Ass'n v. City of Salem1 a8 is indicative of
the tension that this deficiency creates. Specifically, direct government
employment constitutes a substantial amount of overall available work.
This fact indicates that such employment is "sufficiently fundamental" to
render the Privileges and Immunities Clause applicable. Nonetheless,
there is uncertainty as to whether public, employment truly constitutes a
protected "common calling." This uncertainty creates the potential for
Sloviter then discussed the appellants' Equal Protection Clause claims. Id. at 276-
77 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Judge expressed concern that the resi-
dency scheme had so many exceptions that it could be considered irrational. Id.
(Sloviter, C.J., dissenting). She also suggested that the worker dismissed in Salem
may have been a victim of selective enforcement. Id. at 277 (Sloviter, C.J.,
dissenting).
180. Id. at 276 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting) (stating economic importance of
public employment exceeds other trades held "fundamental"); see Supreme Court
of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 283 (1985) (holding practice of law to be funda-
mental); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 493 (1948) (holding shrimp fishing to be
fundamental); Silver v. Garcia, 760 F.2d 33, 36 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding insurance
consulting to be fundamental).
181. See Salem, 33 F.3d at 270 (holding that public employment does not im-
plicate Privileges and Immunities Clause because there is distinction between pub-
lic and private employment).
182. See id. at 276 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting) (stating that majority analysis
"pretermits" Privileges and Immunities Clause analysis). However, this speaks only
to the initial inquiry into whether there is discrimination against a fundamental
interest. Id. Moreover, one must recognize that Salem's use of its own funds was a
significant factor in the assessment of the preference's reasons and "substantial
relatedness." See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465
U.S. 208, 221 (1984) (stating fact that Camden was expending funds was "perhaps
a crucial factor" in determining whether its ordinance violated Privileges and Im-
munities Clause, but did not remove ordinance from purview of clause).
183. 33 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1105 (1995).
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genuine infringement upon privileges and immunities of noncitizens de-
serving protection.
George T. Reynolds
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